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Two explanations for collective behavior were contrasted. The first, exemplified 
by relative deprivation theory, stresses the importance of feelings of moral outrage 
and perceived economic injustice. The second focuses on more pragmatic con- 
siderations, such as the availability of resources for mobilization. The present 
study examines these explanations for collective behavior in a laboratory setting. 
Subjects were members of a disadvantaged group. In a 3 x 2 factorial design 
two independent variables were manipulated. The magnitude of pay inequality 
between the disadvantaged group and a more advantaged group was manipulated 
to be large, moderate, or small. Mobilization resources available to the disad- 
vantaged group were manipulated to be either present or absent. In accord with 
predictions based on relative deprivation theory, as the magnitude of the inequality 
increased, stronger feelings of deprivation were expressed. However, contrary 
to relative deprivation theory, larger magnitudes of inequality and stronger feelings 
of deprivation were not associated with greater willingness to engage in legitimate 
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or illegitimate forms of collective behavior. Instead, as predicted by some critics 
of relative deprivation theory, willinginess to engage in illegitimate forms of 
collective behavior was affected only by a pragmatic consideration: the presence 
or absence of mobilization resources. 
Revolutions are often described as struggles for people’s hearts and 
minds, in which feelings about injustice play a major role. Such discussions 
assume or assert that rebellious forms of collective behavior will not 
occur unless the disadvantaged come to feel morally outraged about their 
unjust treatment (e.g., Aristotle, 1962; Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 
1981; Fanon, 1963; Moore, 1978). For example, one review of this literature 
dismisses research on outrage and perceived injustice as “obvious and 
trite, for surely only angry men turn to revolution” (Kramnick, 1972, 
p. 56). 
THE RELATIVE DEPRIVATION EXPLANATION OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Relative deprivation (RD) theory elaborates the moral outrage explanation 
for collective behavior. The RD argument contains two essential parts: 
(1) Some aspect of the distribution of outcomes (such as the magnitude 
of inequality or a change in prosperity levels) causes feelings of deprivation 
(such as discontent, outrage, resentment, or perceived injustice), and 
(2) feelings of deprivation are associated with individual willingness 
to engage in collective behavior. 
There is controversy about the validity of these two propositions, in 
part because the empirical evidence is inconclusive. The majority of the 
relevant studies have attempted to find a direct association between 
objective outcomes and collective behavior, without measuring feelings 
of deprivation (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 
1977; Grofman & Mullet-, 1973; Martin & Murray, 1984). This is unfortunate, 
because one’s objective position in a distribution of outcomes is not an 
accurate predictor of one’s feelings of deprivation. Deprivation is labeled 
“relative” because often the people who feel the most deprived are not 
those who are objectively the most destitute (Runciman, 1966; Stouffer 
et al., 1949). 
This unfortunate decision is made for understandable reasons. It is 
difficult to obtain data about participants’ feelings immediately prior to 
such activities as the French revolution or the Watts riots. For similar 
reasons, these studies often do not include measures of individual will- 
ingness to engage in collective action. Instead, aggregate measures are 
used, such as the frequency of civil disorders or the timing of the onset 
of a revolution. 
Given these methodological problems, it is not surprising that these 
studies come to differing conclusions about the relationship between 
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outcome distributions and collective behavior. Some of these studies 
propose that pessimism, triggered by unchanging or deteriorating economic 
conditions, serves as a trigger for collective action (Abeles, 1976; Caplan 
& Paige, 1968; Pettigrew, 1980). Other studies conclude that optimism 
and rising expectations, prompted by improving economic conditions, 
catalyze collective behavior (e.g., Davies, 1969; Gurr, 1970). The remainder 
of these studies fail to find a consistent or clear-cut relationship between 
economic conditions and collective action (e.g., McPhail, 1971; Snyder 
& Tilly, 1980; Spilerman, 1970). 
A second type of study has focused on part 2 of the RD argument, 
seeking an association between feelings of deprivation and individual 
willingness to engage in collective action. Again, the empirical record is 
mixed, primarily because these studies measure different types of de- 
privation. General deprivation is discontent, for example, with one’s job, 
which includes no specified comparative referent. Egoistic deprivation 
is discontent caused by a comparison of one’s own outcomes to those 
of someone similar. In accord with recent research on the effects of self- 
interest on political attitudes (e.g., Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980), 
general and egoistic measures of deprivation have generally failed to 
predict collective behavior (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Grofman & Mullet-, 1973; 
Martin & Murray, 1983; Miller, Bolce, & Halligan, 1977), although ex- 
ceptions have been found (Crawford & Naditch, 1970; Sears & McConahay, 
1973). 
Fraternal deprivation is discontent that stems from a comparison between 
disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Perhaps because collective action 
is an attempt to change the way outcomes are distributed to an entire 
group, efforts to find an association between fraternal deprivation and 
collective action have generally been more successful. Feelings of fraternal 
deprivation have been associated with student protest behavior, militant 
political attitudes, and willingness to be aggressive in a laboratory setting 
(Guimond, 1979; Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; Ross, Thibaut, & Ev- 
enbeck, 1971). Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972) found that people who 
felt both egoistically and fraternally-that is, doubly-deprived, were 
more likely to engage in one form of collective behavior: voting incumbent 
politicians out of office. However, efforts to find an association between 
feelings of fraternal deprivation and willingness to engage in collective 
action in work settings have been less successful (De Carufel, 1981; 
Graham, 1983; Martin, 1981). 
The occasional, if not universal, failure of RD research to demonstrate 
a link to collective behavior could be due to (1) a failure to measure 
feelings of deprivation in a consistent and appropriate manner, (2) a 
problem with part 1 of the RD argument, (3) a problem with part 2, or 
(4) a problem with both parts. 
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THE PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Other explanations for collective behavior have a coolly pragmatic 
tone. Rather than studying emotions of outrage and perceived injustice, 
attention is focused on structural factors, relevant to the distribution of 
power and resources in a system (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 
1978). The central argument is that the disadvantaged will engage in 
collective action if they have the resources believed necessary for successful 
mobilization, for example, opportunities to come into contact with each 
other (e.g., Liebow, 1967; McCall, 1970; McPhail, 1971; Smelser, 1980), 
the power that comes from offering services essential for the effective 
functioning of the system (e.g., Skocpol, 1979; Smelser, 1980) and the 
incentive of knowing that other, similarly disadvantaged groups have 
mobilized (e.g., Tilly, 1978). 
There is an extreme version of the pragmatic position. Its advocates 
note that rebellious collective action has been associated with improving 
and deteriorating levels of prosperity, with stability and with change, 
and with increases and decreases in the magnitudes of inequality between 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. They conclude that economic 
conditions may be relatively unimportant contributors to collective action 
(see Kramnick, 1972, for a review). Further, they note that it is possible 
to be deeply angry about an injustice, yet not engage in any kind of 
action. According to this extreme version of the pragmatic approach, if 
people have the resources for potentially effective mobilization, they will 
engage in collective action-even in the absence of potentially aggravating 
economic conditions, even if they do not feel unjustly treated (cf. 
Linewebber, Barr-Bryan, & Zelditch, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; 
Tilly, 1978). Thus, acting from self-interest rather than moral righteousness, 
people take what they can get. 
EXAMINING THE RELATIVE MERITS OFTHE TWO EXPLANATIONS 
The present study is an attempt to explore these issues using experimental 
methodology in a laboratory setting. Subjects were members of a dis- 
advantaged group. In a 3 x 2 factorial design, two independent variables 
were manipulated. The magnitude of pay inequality, between the disad- 
vantaged group and a more advantaged group, was manipulated to be 
large, moderate, or small. Mobilization resources available to the dis- 
advantaged group were manipulated to be either present or absent. De- 
pendent variables included measures of fraternal deprivation, egoistic 
deprivation, and individual willingness to engage in a variety of collective 
behaviors aimed at reducing the pay inequality. 
This design can be used to test alternative explanations for collective 
action. According to the pessimistic version of RD theory, as the magnitude 
of the pay inequality increases, feelings of deprivation should be stronger 
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and willingness to engage in collective behavior should be greater. Ac- 
cording to the optimistic version of RD theory, as the magnitude of the 
pay inequality decreases, feelings of deprivation should be stronger and 
willingness to engage in collective action should be greater. If the pragmatic 
approach is correct, collective behavior should be greater when mobilization 
resources are present rather than absent. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 90 females recruited for a study of “pay satisfaction” and were paid $5 
each. All subjects were currently, or had been, employed full time.’ Subjects were randomly 
assigned to conditions. Cell sizes were unequal, ranging from 11 to 18 subjects. 
Procedure 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were greeted by an experimenter who announced 
that the study would focus on pay levels at California Oil Company (Cal Oil). Subjects 
were told that they would see a slide and tape presentation describing the company and 
the requirements of a sales manager position there. The tape recording described, in 
informal language, the responsibilities and daily activities of actual sales managers at an 
oil company. While the tape recording was played, a coordinated set of slides was shown. 
These slides portrayed three sales managers at work, for example, talking on the telephone 
or completing paper work in their offices. One of the pictured sales managers was female; 
the other two were male. After the slide and tape show, the subjects were handed “sup- 
plemental fact sheets, ” which contained “some facts about the current situation of sales 
managers at Cal Oil.” These fact sheets contained the experimental manipulations. After 
studying the fact sheets, the subjects completed a questionnaire concerning their opinions 
about the sales manager job at Cal Oil. This questionnaire included the dependent measures 
and manipulaton checks. The experimenter then led an informal discussion about the study 
and thanked the subjects for their participation. All subjects were paid $5 and subsequently 
received a brief report of the results of the study. 
Experimental Manipulations 
Because the experimental manipulations were contained in the supplemental fact sheets, 
the experimenter remained blind to the conditions to which the subjects had been assigned. 
The fact sheet presented the results of a recent survey conducted by members of the 
compensation department at Cal Oil. The survey focused on the financial rewards received 
by sales managers. Such rewards included a base salary, bonuses, commissions, chances 
for promotion, as well as “executive perks” such as lavish expense accounts and access 
to company cars. The survey measured the percentage of female sales managers who were 
receiving financial treatment equal to that received by comparable male sales managers. 
In the large inequality condition, only 2% of the female sales executives were receiving 
’ In order to maximize subjects’ anonymity, demographic data were not collected. Informal 
conversations during debriefing sessions indicated that the sample was diverse. Occupations 
included waitress, accountant, lawyer, clerical worker, teacher, nurse, and personnel ex- 
ecutive. Ages ranged from early 20s to late 60s. Some subjects had not finished high school, 
while others had completed some postgraduate work. The subjects participated in one of 
four sessions in groups comprised of 11, 19, 26, or 34 individuals. Preliminary data analyses 
revealed no significant differences among the testing groups. 
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financial benefits equal to those of comparable males. In the moderate inequality condition, 
the percentage was 12%, and in the small inequality condition, the percentage was 88%. 
(Pretests indicated that 100% equality was considered unrealistic.) 
Three types of mobilization resources were manipulated to be simultaneously present 
or absent. In conditions where the three mobilization factors were present, the female 
sales managers had frequent formal and informal contact with each other, their sales 
management skills were critical for the survival of the firm and difficult to replace, and 
female executives at another corporation had formed themselves into a formal group. In 
conditions where mobilization factors were absent, the female sales managers had little 
formal or informal contact, the sales manager position was less essential for the firm’s 
survival, as many other employees had the requisite marketing skills, and no mention was 
made of female executives at other organizations forming formal groups. 
Dependent Measures 
All dependent measures asked subjects to respond as if they were sales managers at 
Cal Oil. Two items focused on the treatment of the female sales managers as a group, as 
compared to the male sales managers: “To what extent are female sales managers as a 
group being treated unjustly?” and “To what extent does the treatment of the female sales 
managers as a group make you feel discontent. 9” Responses to these items were summed 
to create an index of fraternal deprivation. These and all other deprivation questions were 
answered on lOO-point scales with the endpoints labeled not at all unjustly (discontent) 
and totally unjustly (discontent). 
The questionnaire indicated to each subject individually that, if she were to work at Cal 
Oil as a sales manager, her personal financial compensation level would be relatively low 
for this position: “Although you are not absolutely sure, you strongly suspect that your 
personal financial rewards (including base salary, bonuses, executive perks, etc., are less 
than those received by other sales managers.” This information was credible, as the 
experience levels of the subjects were similar to those of the lower paid sales managers 
portrayed in the slide and tape show. Two dependent measures focused on the subjects’ 
reactions to their individual pay levels: “To what extent do you think your personal financial 
treatment is unjust?” and “To what extent does your personal financial treatment make 
you feel discontent?” Responses to these two items were summed, to create an index of 
egoistic deprivation. 
Subjects also assessed their willingness to engage in a variety of collective behaviors. 
In order to maximize the chances of finding a relationship between feelings of deprivation 
and willingness to engage in collective action, a wide range of behaviors were measured. 
Subjects were told that “a meeting has been called for all sales managers to discuss the 
issue of whether male and female sales managers have been receiving equal financial 
treatment. Assuming you could attend the meeting, what is the likelihood that you would 
engage in each of the activities listed below?” The likelihood of each behavior was rated 
on a loo-point scale, with 0% indicating no chance of participation and 100% indicating 
certainty of engagement in the activity. 
Some of the activities were responses to compensation grievances that would be considered 
standard and legitimate in most organizational settings: “attend the meeting; urge two or 
three friends to be sure and attend the meeting; donate money to cover incidental expenses 
for the meeting (if so. how much?); distribute reminders about the meeting; agree to serve 
on the five-member coordinating committee for future meetings; serve as chairperson for 
the meeting; argue that a delegation carry any complaints the group may have to upper 
management.” Other activities had a more illegitimate tone, in the sense that norms of 
politeness, ethics, or company loyalty would be broken: “give the cold shoulder to someone 
who refused to attend the meeting; suggest the group engage in a short work slow-down, 
for example. by showing up 30 minutes late for a sales review session: suggest the group 
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engage in petty acts of sabotage, such as deliberately making mistakes in sales report 
procedures; suggest that the group picket the front door of Cal Oil during lunch hour.” 
In addition, noncollective behavioral options were measured: “try harder to improve 
your performance on the job, for example by selling more; try less hard on the job, for 
example by sometimes taking it easy rather than putting forth that extra effort: take night 
courses to improve your marketing skills; begin to look for a job at another company.” 
Manipulation Checks 
After responding to the dependent measures, subjects were asked to recall (with no 
access to the supplemental fact sheet), “What percentage of the female sales managers 
received financial rewards less than those of comparable male sales managers?” This item 
assessed the perceived magnitude of inequality. 
Subjects were asked separate questions about the three mobilization resources: “Do 
channels already exist for formal and informal contact and communication among female 
sales managers? Is the sales manager position critical or peripheral to the operation of Cal 
Oil? Do you think that female executives at other firms like Cal Oil have mobilized 
themselves into formal groups ?” All manipulation checks were answered on lOO-point 
scales with endpoints labeled appropriately. 
RESULTS 
All dependent variables were analyzed with 3 (magnitude of inequality: 
large, moderate, or small) x 2 (mobilization resources: present or absent) 
analyses of variance. 
Manipulation Checks 
Subjects’ perceptions of the magnitude of inequality between the male 
and female sales managers were quite accurate. As expected, the magnitude 
of the manipulated inequality had a significant main effect on these es- 
timates, F(2, 82) = 4.14, p < .03. Each level of inequality contributed 
equally to this effect. No other significant main effect or interaction was 
found. 
Manipulations of two of the three mobilization resources were also 
successful. As expected, there was a significant main effect of manipulated 
mobilization resources on subjects’ assessments of the preexisting channels 
for contact among the female sales managers and on their estimates of 
whether the sales manager position was critical to the operation of Cal 
Oil, F(2, 82) = 31.25, p < .OOOl, and F(2, 82) = 216.64, p < .OOOl, 
respectively. No other main effects or interactions in these analyses were 
significant. Contrary to expectations, subjects in all conditions were equally 
likely to say that female executives at other organizations had formed 
a formal group. The failure to manipulate this third mobilization resource 
does not prevent use of this independent variable, because the remaining 
two resources were successfully manipulated. 
Feelings of Deprivation 
Table 1 presents the deprivation data. The magnitude of the inequality 
between the male and female sales managers had a significant main effect 
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TABLE 1 
MEAN FEELINGS OF DEPRIVATION AS A FUNCTION OF MAGNITUDE OF INEQUALITY AND 
RESOURCES FOR MOBILIZATION 
Feelings of deprivation 
Mobilization resources Fraternal Egoistic 
Present 
Large inequality 89.94 87.78 
Moderate inequality 88.93 90.71 
Small inequality 40.83 65.00 
Absent 
Large inequality 85.25 93.82 
Moderate inequality 83.14 85.29 
Small inequality 49.55 70.45 
Note. The higher the score, the greater the feelings of deprivation (discontent and 
injustice). 
on the female subjects’ feelings of fraternal and egoistic deprivation, F(2, 
82) = 36.52, p < .OOOl, and F(2, 82) = 9.10, p < .OOOl, respectively. 
In accord with the pessimistic version of RD theory, feelings of deprivation 
were stronger in conditions where the magnitude of inequality was larger. 
Although the magnitude of inequality had a slightly stronger effect on 
fraternal, rather than egoistic, deprivation, the pattern of results for the 
two types of deprivation was similar. Thus, in Vanneman and Pettigrew’s 
terms, as the magnitude of inequality increased, subjects were more likely 
to express double-that is, both fraternal and egoistic-deprivation. The 
presence or absence of mobilization resources had no significant main 
effect on feelings of deprivation and no significant interaction was found, 
all F’s < 1. 
Individual Willingness to Engage in Collective Action 
Table 2 presents the collective behavior data. The likelihoods of engaging 
in all the legitimate forms of collective behavior were summed to create 
an index. A similar index was created for the illegitimate forms of collective 
behavior. These indexes were used to calculate the means reported in 
Table 2 and the analyses of variance results reported below. Behavioral 
items were assigned to these indexes on the basis of a priori conceptual 
distinctions. These data were also analyzed for each dependent variable 
separately. A variety of other conceptually and empirically designed 
indexes of collective behavior were also used. In order to determine if 
willingness to engage in the noncollective behaviors affected the results 
reported below, all analyses of variance were repeated, using various 
combinations of the noncollective behaviors as covariates. The results 
of all these analyses did not substantively differ from those described 
below. 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AS A FUNCTION OF MAGNITUDE 


















Note. The higher the score, the greater the likelihood of engaging in the behaviors. 
The independent variables did not affect willingness to engage in the 
legitimate forms of collective behavior. No significant main effects or 
interaction was found, all F’s < 2. In all conditions, approximately two 
thirds of the subjects were willing to engage in these standard, legitimate 
forms of collective behavior. Mobilization resources, however, did have 
a significant main effect on willingness to engage in the illegitimate forms 
of collective behavior, F(2, 82) = 5,23, p < .025. Such behavior was 
more likely in the conditions where mobilization resources were present. 
The magnitude of inequality had no significant main effect on willingness 
to engage in these illegitimate forms of collective behavior, and no significant 
interactions were found, all F’s < 1. Thus, feelings of fraternal and 
egoistic deprivation-even double deprivation-were not related to in- 
dividual willingness to engage in collective action. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study support the pessimistic version of part 1 of 
the RD argument; as the magnitude of inequality increased, stronger 
feelings of egoistic and fraternal deprivation were expressed. The data, 
however, provided no support for the Part 2 of the RD analysis; larger 
magnitudes of inequality and stronger feelings of deprivation were not 
associated with greater willingness to engage in legitimate or illegitimate 
forms of collective behavior. Instead, willingness to engage in illegitimate 
forms of collective behavior was influenced by the presence or absence 
of mobilization resources. 
Limitations of the Design 
It is possible that magnitudes of inequality and feelings of deprivation 
impact willingness to engage in collective action, but the limitations of 
the present study prevented detection of these relationships. Perhaps 
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greater magnitudes of inequality should have been studied, in order to 
focus on more severely disadvantaged groups, such as the poor or victims 
of severe racial discrimination. Perhaps feelings of injustice could have 
been intensified and willingness to engage in behaviors could have been 
more realistically assessed, if the study had not used a modified role 
play design, with pencil-and-paper measures of behavior. Role play studies 
of injustice, in particular, can produce misleading results (due to social 
desirability effects) if role playing subjects respond without becoming 
emotionally involved (Lerner, 1981). It is difficult, however, to design 
a study that avoids these limitations, elicits stronger feelings of moral 
outrage, and does not transgress ethical boundaries. 
There are some reasons to believe that these limitations may not have 
strongly affected the results of the study. It was decided not to focus 
on a severely disadvantaged group because feelings of deprivation tend 
to be most intense among those who are moderately, rather than least, 
prosperous (Runciman, 1966; Stouffer et al., 1949). Efforts were made 
to enhance the mundane reality and external validity of the experimental 
setting by using job descriptions and pay levels from an actual company 
and recruiting adult subjects with full-time working experience. In order 
to minimize social desirability effects, questionnaire responses were written 
and anonymous, and no demographic information about individual subjects 
was collected. In addition, the emotional involvement of the subjects 
was evident during debriefing sessions. In spite of these considerations, 
however, it is possible that one or more of these limitations may have 
made it difficult to detect a relationship to collective behavior. 
Considering the Personal Costs of Behaviors 
It is possible that the results of the present study were affected by 
the costs of engaging in various forms of collective behavior. The legitimate 
behaviors studied involved relatively low personal costs. In addition, the 
subjects may have brought a threshold level of perceived injustive with 
them into the laboratory. There are three indications that indirectly support 
this threshold contention: the pretest evidence that a 100% equality ma- 
nipulation would not be credible, the failure of one of the resource 
availability manipulations, because all subjects were equally likely to 
assume that females at other institutions had organized themselves into 
a formal group, and the emotional involvement of subjects during the 
debriefing sessions. If the legitimate behaviors were relatively low cost, 
and if subjects brought a threshold level of perceived injustice into the 
laboratory, then the presence of even slight magnitudes of inequality 
may have been sufficient to trigger these behaviors. In this context, it 
is not surprising that approximately two thirds of the subjects in all 
conditions were willing to engage in the legitimate forms of collective 
behavior. 
494 MARTIN, BRICKMAN, AND MURRAY 
The illegitimate behaviors in the present study may have entailed rel- 
atively high costs for these subjects, in part because females are much 
less likely than males to engage in aggressive behavior (Maccoby & 
Jacqulin, 1974). Fewer than 15% of the subjects in any condition were 
willing to engage in the illegitimate forms of collective behavior. Perhaps 
the subjects’ general unwillingness to engage in these behaviors may 
have created a “floor effect,” thereby limiting the extent to which will- 
ingness to engage in these behaviors could be differentiated as a function 
of magnitudes of inequality or intensity of feelings of deprivation. 
If this cost analysis is correct, the results of the present study may 
help explain the mixed results of previous RD research. The previous 
studies that failed to find a relationship to collective action focused on 
high-cost behaviors, such as participation in revolution and violent riots. 
More successful studies tended to focus on somewhat less costly behaviors, 
such as student participation in peaceful protests, willingness to advocate 
militant attitudes, and aggression against strangers in a laboratory setting. 
These results suggest that changes in the magnitude of inequality or the 
intensity of feelings of injustice might have greater impact on moderately 
costly forms of collective behavior. Future RD research could easily 
incorporate pretest data that scaled personal costs associated with various 
types of collective behavior. 
Moral Outrage and Pragmatism 
In spite of limitations in design and in the types of behavior studied, 
the present study did elicit considerable variation in feelings of deprivation 
and did examine a wide range of collective behaviors. The results of the 
present study are consistent with a third interpretation, in which feelings 
of injustice play a secondary role. In this domain, as in other domains 
of psychological research, emotional attitudes may be loosely coupled 
with behavior. Although increases in the magnitude of inequality may 
cause feelings of injustice, those feelings may make a relatively small 
contribution to decisions about participation in collective action. Instead, 
those decisions may be primarily made on a pragmatic rather than emotional 
basis, including consideration, for example, of the availability of mobi- 
lization resources and the personal costs of the behavior. 
If this pragmatic explanation is correct, then how can it be reconciled 
with the results of the previous research that has sporadically found 
support for part 2 of the RD argument? The pragmatic explanation portrays 
rebels as rational cost-benefit analysts, who have calculated that they 
have the potential of gaining something at an acceptable level of risk. 
Some participants in collective actions may find the RD explanation for 
their behavior, which implies they are morally outraged victims of injustice, 
publicly and personally more appealing. When people are asked, during 
or after the fact, to explain their participation in collective action, many 
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may prefer moral outrage explanations which fit the RD argument, rather 
than admit to themselves, or to others, their more pragmatic calculations. 
Researchers, then, may take this rhetoric to be a full and accurate de- 
scription of the causes of collective action, concluding that “surely only 
angry men turn to revolution.” Instead, these people may be offering 
self-enhancing, post hoc rationalizations for their behavior. 
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